I’m not sure I can adequately express my hatred for the University of Florida. Like breathing, I don’t remember when I began, but I know I always have. It feels as old as myself and as irrational as the love for my family and (home) state. I immediately distrust and dislike a person who claims Florida, the state or the school. Because I am a rational person, I bite back that instinct and try—try—to give that person a benefit of doubt. They did not choose to be born in that hell pit of treasonous salt marsh. Perhaps someone held hostage their families for all four years of their enrollment. And yes, it’s easy to say that you’d let your family die rather than go to UF, and maybe you would, but we’re dealing with irrational love versus irrational hate, so who knows what might happen.
Before the game my girlfriend said she understood why I watch football, but she didn’t understand why I allowed myself to invest so much emotional energy in a game that I would be a thousand miles from. I smiled down at her innocent face. I asked her how else she suggested I deal with my feelings of futility and insecurity. I said I must place my feelings of self-doubt, my knowledge of my myriad failures, and the vanishing moments of my life in the hands of young, strong Adonises so they may carry them away for a few hours.
Despite my loathing, I don’t feel defeated or crushed by Saturday’s loss. I’m wounded and disappointed, but my enmity for Florida is undying and I find solace in that. The faces and bodies change, but it is the banner we fight. We will play Florida next year and I will feel the same. There is hope in that.
It might also be learned failure. It’s been 11 years and the memories of victory seem far off and watery.
New coach Jim McElwain said, “I think down deep, you just don’t lose to Tennessee. And they didn’t.” I will never forgive him for that statement. I will spit bile when I speak his name for him saying that. Partially because I’m terrified I’m starting to believe him.
Anyway, there’s a game to talk about.
IN MADDEN I LEARNED NOT TO CALL THE SAME PLAY TWICE
Many have criticized Butch Jones for not going for two when Jalen Hurd scored in the fourth quarter. I understand the frustration and mostly agree. It probably would have been the right call. It is also indicative of the play calling that has plagued UT this year. It is also an easy lightning rod reference point for simple polemics.
The larger play calling issue I saw came on the defensive side of the ball. Nine times on Saturday the Vols decided to play to their weakness rather than their strength by rushing three and spying a defensive end. During the week leading up to the game many writers including Daniel Lewis of Rocky Top Insider argued that a Vol win would include a strong pass rush. Both UT and UF have young offensive lines, but coming into the game it seemed UT might have the edge at defensive line. Florida quarterback Will Grier is an unproven redshirt freshman. The five guys who line up in front of him are green and won’t be making the all-American team. Send five and pray the secondary plays a hair above replacement-level sounded like a solid strategy.
Florida seemed to show up when they needed to most. On first and second downs Tennessee’s defensive line hurried Grier and dealt with running back Kevin Taylor pretty well. On those downs Jones and defensive coordinator John Jancek sent at least four linemen after Grier, often sending an extra man from different linebacker, safety, or corner. The moved pass rushing powerhouse Derek Barnett around the line to good effect, and for most of the game Barnett and Corey Vereen could be found toasting the men trying to block them. This worked out well and helped the Vols amass a lead.
Through four games it is pretty clear that the strength of the Tennessee defense is not the secondary. At worst the DBs look like Cameron Sutton and a bunch of guys wearing the same clothes, and at best it’s a serviceable position group capable of making one or two plays per game. If you watch the front seven, you’ll notice they usually control how the DBs look. When Barnett, Vereen, Reeves-Maybin and Co. are rushing the passer, that’s when the DBs don’t look like dumb dogs chasing smart cats.
But Jones and Jancek changed the scheme when they had UF facing 3rd or 4th and long. On nine of the 13 times the Vols had the Gators six or more yards behind the eight ball, they ran the same scheme: Two D-lineman and one defensive end would rush after Grier while the second defensive end spied Grier in case he scrambled.
Most of the time only rushing three basically worked. Six of those nine plays resulted in UF failing to achieve a 1st down. But this was mainly due to how incredible Barnett and the defensive line looked in this game. Even rushing three, Grier was forced out of the pocket and into hurried throws. A couple times the Gators’ O-line was badly beaten and Grier was only able to throw the ball away a split-second before being sacked. It isn’t absurd to think that had UT rushed four, some of those incompletions would be sacks.
In trying to Band Aid the gaping holes in the secondary, Tennessee not only made their defense weaker overall, but also they became predicable. In Florida’s last seven 3rd/4th and long situations Tennessee only rushed four once. They preferred to run a rush three, spy one prevent defense. They ran this scheme on UF’s game winning pass play. As they had on the play directly before it. As they had on the previous drive with UF facing 4th and 8. As they had 70% of the time the Gators were in similar situations. When Florida’s game was on the line with 4th and 14 to go, Jim McElwain could comfortably assume that his QB would only face three rushers.
Grier had time. He made the throw. The secondary was out of position, which should surprise no one. The execution of the play wasn’t good, and it’s easy to blame one play, especially when it’s the play that decides the game, but the fault is on the predictable pattern of play. Tennessee’s defense did not collapse. Florida figured it out.
JONATHAN BULLARD DOES A PRETTY GOOD JJ WATT IMPRESSION
Last week I almost wrote about #71 Dylan Wiesman and the offensive line’s woes. Instead I decided to watch the line closely week game, and, dear god, it was a horror show.
#90 Jonathan Bullard, defensive lineman for the University of Florida, found this aimless group of young men calling themselves tackles and guards, and decided to eat them alive while they flailed their hands in his face.
Bullard set the tone of the game and was behind nearly every decisive play against the UT offense. Officially he recorded eight tackles, including three for loss and one sack, but that does not fully describe the way the manhandled the Tennessee linemen.
Early in the second quarter, Tennessee ran the ball well, but Ballard wore on the line, pushing them around. On one power run, #63 Brett Kendrick was burdened with Bullard. His job was to derail Bullard as the center and guard kicked out to block for Hurd at the edge. But Bullard was a quick step ahead of everyone. Instead of being derailed he pushed Kendrick back into the center and guard. The play still went for two yards, but dealing with Bullard all day was a nagging problem that added to the feeling that the game might tilt in Florida’s favor at any moment.
Bullard had more impressive plays than this one in the first half of the game, but I think this play illustrates best how he disrupted the game on each snap he played. Tennessee’s young and unsure O-linemen knew each time Bullard launched from his stance he would be faster and stronger. He would be in better position and quicker. Think of fighting with a prime-aged, vicious but toothless, pit bull for 30 minutes. The dog isn’t going to kill or maim you, but he is going to lunge at and ram and bulrush you. You’ll have to bend and try to catch him while he twists around you. Your muscles will ache from trying to hold him. You’ll bruise from where he hits you, where you fall. His bald gums will clamp your arms and push them against your chest. After a while, you’ll just want to give up because the dog is better at fighting that you. It’s okay. No one expected you to be better than him, you’ll tell yourself.
I assume that’s what blocking Jonathan Bullard was like on Saturday.
I assume that’s how #71 Dylan Wiesman felt between the Florida scoring drives in the fourth quarter as UT tried to run the ball and hold on to a six-point lead. On 1st down Coleman Thomas hiked the ball and Bullard rammed Wiesman a couple yard into the backfield so when Jalen Hurd ran by Bullard tossed Wiesman aside and tackled Hurd.
I assume both Wiesman and Kirkland were nearly crippled by fatigue and frustration when a play later on a crucial 3rd and 6, Bullard pushed both linemen back into Dobbs’ path during a designed QB run. Bottled up, Dobbs found himself three yards behind the line of scrimmage and in the meeting place of three colliding bodies.
When UT led, it was easy to overlook the havoc Bullard wreaked on the line because he wasn’t sacking Dobbs or tackling Hurd for huge losses, but as the game wore on and got closer in points, it became clear that the offensive line was beleaguered and gassed. Bullard’s constant harassment and near misses became suddenly visible as big stops and momentum shifts.
JOSH DOBBS AND JALEN HURD DON’T NEED AN OFFENSIVE LINE
Tennessee ran for 254 yards against Florida. They ran 51 times for an average of five yards per carry. Both Dobbs and Hurd surpassed 100 yards. Most of the time, that means that the offensive line played well and set up two pretty talented players for success. From time to time that was true in this game. During the first half while the O-line was still fresh, there were some moments of hope and promise. The first play from scrimmage was well blocked and Hurd took advantage with a 16-yard run.
More often the offensive line looked out of sorts and particularly bad while power blocking. Early in the game Dobbs handed the ball to Hurd from the shotgun. It was a power run to the edge. #75 Marcus Jackson and #71 Wiesman stepped back and pulled to become the lead blockers at the edge—a pretty run of the mill power run—but instead of hitting the corner at roughly the same time Hurd did, Jackson ran into the back of another lineman then Wiesman ran into him, like a three-car pile up. Hurd found the edge filled with Gators. Unfortunately this play is emblematic of the failings of the offensive line this year.
Most often Dobbs and Hurd bailed out their offensive line with open field heroics and pure speed. They shrugged off and juked away from defenders all day. They ignored terrible blocks and missed assignments. Hurd constantly found his running lanes filled with Gators and was forced to find the edge. Because he is an excellent athlete, he was able to muscle out decent gains on the outside. Dobbs’ rushes are much the same story. Too many came after dodging defenders streaking into the backfield. I can’t say Dobbs looked good throwing the ball, but he bailed out the offence with his feet often enough to make me think there’s no better option.
It seems clear that Butch Jones understands that his offensive line lacks . . . well . . . just lacks the things—aside from big bodies—are needed to play offensive line. If we look at UT’s biggest offensive plays from the game, we see that they are all designed to make up for those failings.
Tennessee’s first score was on a double pass designed to get the entire defense on one side of the field. Dobbs passed to Juan Jennings, the defense swarmed to that side, Jennings passed the ball back to Dobbs, and he ran to the end zone more or less uncontested. The job of the offensive line on this play is better described as “getting in the way” than “blocking.”
Dobbs’ 62-yard run in the final minutes of the first half came on a designed quarterback draw. This play also limited the importance of the offensive line. Here most linemen needed only nudge defensive linemen as they streak past so Dobbs could run by them before the linemen could adjust. Despite the design of the play, Wiesman still managed to miss his block at the second level. Because Josh Dobbs is an intrepid hero, he spun Gator LB Antonio Morrison out of his shoes.
To Butch Jones’ credit, he tailored the offensive game plan to his runners’ strengths. Trick plays, screens, and draws are obvious bright spots, but this game also featured much more read-option. With Dobbs at QB, Jones has always run the read-option, but he’s mixed it with a healthy amount of passing (because in theory we have very talented receivers). The read-option is designed to keep the defense off-balance to make up for poor line play, which is why we saw so much of it against Florida. As much as I’m annoyed with the completely predictable defensive game plan that did highlighted the defense’s weakness, I’m pleased that Butch Jones seems to be adapting to his quarterback’s anxiety in the pocket and his offensive line’s sub-par performance.


















